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Postmodernism and criminological thought: ‘whose science, whose 
knowledge?’ 
Liz Austen with Malcolm Cowburn 
 
Introduction 
In 1991 Sandra Harding published her seminal work on scientific inquiry 
Whose Science Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives; this 
chapter borrows part of the title of her book to highlight the challenge to 
established forms of knowledge that is presented by post-modern thought.  
The challenge is epistemological and ethical. It involves re-examining the 
basis of criminological knowledge and how this impacts on the practices of 
criminal justice agencies.  Key to this exploration is the social construction of 
crime. From a postmodern perspective, crime, people who commit crimes, 
people who suffer as a result of crimes and the legal processes through which 
crimes are defined and processed are not considered only to have objective 
characteristics that can be measured and described.  They are open to 
interpretation and it is interpretation that ‘constructs’ the science and the 
knowledge.  Post-modernism introduces the possibility of there being many 
voices that can contribute to understanding.  It challenges the authority of 
positivist-dominated criminology to speak about crime, criminals and victims.  
It demands a re-examination of criminal justice processes that are 
underpinned by positivist assumptions and positivist forms of knowledge.  In 
bringing these challenges post-modernist approaches provide a means 
whereby the experiences and voices of marginalised groups (for example 
women, minority ethnic groups, sexual minorities disabled people and victims 
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of crime) can enter the dominant discourses that shape criminology and 
community justice.   
 
In doing this, post-modern theory demands that the question first posed by 
Becker (1967) concerning ‘sides’ and ‘allegiances’ in relation to research and 
(by extension) policy and practice, is addressed. By giving voice to groups, 
their ‘side’ is more clearly articulated.  By problematising the authority of  
‘scientific’ epistemologies, it could be argued that post-modern thought is 
clearly on the ‘side’ of the subordinate; the person, group or community that is 
defined and contained by someone else’s knowledge.  However, it is not that 
straightforward.  As other chapters in this book show, taking sides is not 
merely a binary choice.  Post-modernism highlights this complexity and the 
difficulties involved in articulating allegiances and identifying standpoints. 
 
This chapter first outlines some basic tenets of post-modern thought, it then 
moves on to consider the impact of post-modern thought on theorising crime 
and deviance.  Closely linked to this is how criminological research is 
conducted; the discussion explores this and what it means.  The chapter 
concludes with a reflection on the contribution that postmodernism can make 
to criminology and community justice. 
 
Criminology, positivism, discourse and the post-modern challenge 
 
Criminology has many meanings but at its widest and most commonly 
accepted it is taken to be the scientific understanding of crime and 
criminals. But such a definition will really not get us very far.  For hidden 
within the term there come many different approaches to ‘science’ and 
different disciplines. (Carrabine et al, 2004, p. 4) 
 
In their ‘sociological introduction’ to ‘Criminology’ Carrabine and colleagues 
point to the disturbance that post-modern thought has caused to the academic 
discipline of criminology.  Prior to the challenge of post-modern thinking, the 
words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ represented incontrovertible bodies of 
knowledge underpinned by particular methodological approaches.  The 
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science of crime and criminals operated within what was considered to be 
unproblematic boundaries defined and prescribed by criminal law.  Law as a 
‘grand narrative’ or what was ‘right’ and what was ‘wrong’ was unchallenged,; 
those transgressing its dictates were uncontroversially identified as ‘criminals’, 
and criminals were one of the ‘objects’ of study for the criminologist.  Similarly, 
the method of studying criminals was also an uncontested activity guided by 
the methodological principle of science – objectivity.  The aim of scientific 
inquiry was to understand a phenomenon (in this case crime and the 
criminal), and a key part of understanding was to identify and explain 
causation.  If this part of the study was accurate and effective, it could then be 
employed in predicting future events (crimes) and if prediction was successful 
it could intervene in the criminogenic process and thus reduce crime. Thus 
criminological research could contribute ‘positively’ to creating social 
conditions in which the incidence of crime was reduced and criminals were 
appropriately ‘treated’ by the criminal justice system (CJS). 
 
Postmodern thought has challenged both the epistemological underpinnings 
of much criminological research and has also threatened the ontological 
security of the discipline as a ‘positively’ focused social science.  In his 
seminal text, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Lyotard 
called for ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’ and a rejection of grand 
theories that offered universal explanations of social phenomena or 
prescribed social action based on the theories (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv).  Since 
that date post-modernism has grown and diversified.   
 
It is not the intention here to provide a definitive account of post-modernism; 
to do so may be the activity of a classifying modernist.  However, Cheek & 
Gough (2005, p. 302) suggest  ‘we can no more provide a straightforward 
definition of ‘postmodernism’ than stipulate the meanings of ‘love’ or ‘justice’ – 
these terms are perpetual foci of speculation and debate'.  There are many 
different variations of postmodern thought from the radical postmodernists 
(who promote the end of modernity and a hyper-real replacement) to the 
strategic postmodernists (who reconstruct the notion of modernity) (Lemert 
2005, p. 67). A central principle within post-modernism is disenchantment with 
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traditional, modernist and scientific values (Lea 1993), and, within this, there 
is a rejection of ‘rationality, linearity, progress, and control’ (Cherryholmes 
1988 in Cheek & Gough 2005, p. 302). Gergen (2000, p. 195) suggests that  ‘ 
perhaps it is best to view [post-modernism] as pointing to a range of inter-
related dialogues on our current condition’.  He does, however, go on to 
reflect on the impact of the prefix ‘post’ – it invokes a sense of ‘rapid 
transition’,  ‘a creeping sense of fragmentation’, and: 
a pervasive sense of erosion in a firm sense of self, the falling away of 
traditional values, and the loss of confidence in the grand narratives of 
the past – a trust that governments, economic planners, or scientists, for 
example can lead us to a better future’ (Gergen 2000, p. 195, emphasis 
in original)  
 
In relation to the academic world, Gergen notes that post-modern thought is 
seen ‘set against the modernist faith in the individual mind, rationality, 
objectivity and truth’ (p. 195).   
As mentioned above these characteristics are central to dominant 
understandings of criminology and its historical aspirations to positivist 
knowledge. Reiner (2007:, p. 347) notes: 
 
The term ‘positivism’ in histories of criminological theory is used to refer 
to the project of seeking causal explanations of crime on the 
methodological and logical model attributed to the natural sciences. 
 
But, as implied above, the process of ‘seeking’ was prescribed and defined.  
Social science (in this case criminology) adopted the methodology of natural 
sciences (Nicholson 1995). Key to this methodology is careful systematic 
observation from which general laws are elicited. Van Langenhove (1995) has 
suggested that underpinning the natural science approach to social data is an 
assumption that analysis of ‘facts’, collected through systematic observation, 
and measurement will reveal laws that form the basis of prediction in relation 
to personal behaviours, social movements and so on.  He notes: 
 
Within the natural sciences model for social sciences, the idea of 
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explanation is copied from the models of explanation used in the 
classical physical sciences such as inorganic chemistry and Newtonian 
physics. These models are aimed at generating law-like predictions 
based on causal relations. (Van Langenhove, 1995, p. 14) 
 
However, the process by which data are collected is of crucial importance if 
‘contamination’ is to be avoided.  The prime source of contamination is the 
researcher, her or his personal history, social location, education, and beliefs.  
All of these factors have the potential to introduce ‘bias’ into the research 
process and findings, unless they are very consciously noted and excluded.  
Hammersley and Gomm (2000, p.154) characterise this approach to research 
as ‘foundationalist’ (they note that the term ‘positivist’ has become too ‘elastic’ 
to be of any analytical value).  Foundationalism refers to a research approach 
that uses terms like ‘validity’, ‘error’ and ‘bias’. A key aspect of foundational 
research is that ‘… the sources of data are treated as independent of, and as 
imposing themselves on, the researcher’ (Hammersley and Gomm, p. 154).  
Where error and bias occur it is because of the ‘illegitimate intrusion of 
external factors, notably the subjectivity of the researcher of the influence of 
his or her social context’ (Hammersley and Gomm, p. 154).   Objectivity 
provides the remedy to these faults.  Foundationalist social research may be 
both quantitative and qualitative, but it particularly influences quantitative 
approaches.  Such research, based on ‘hard’ data is particularly influential in 
social/penal policy circles; sometimes the mere presence of statistical 
calculations can appear to ‘[transform] data into valid conclusions’ 
(Hammersley and Gomm, 2000, p. 155).  However, the terminology and 
assumptions of foundationalist research are also found in qualitative work with 
assumptions that interviews are aiming to catch and depict the truth or ‘reality’ 
of a situation separated from the researcher or the research process 
(Hammersley and Gomm (2000, p. 155).  
 
Foundational knowledge, however, does not operate in a vacuum; it is 
inextricably linked to the operation of (political) power.  There is not space 
here to develop fully this relationship, but it is of clear significance for the 
political location of (some) criminological knowledge.  Foucault (1977), for 
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example, has shown how the growth of social scientific knowledge was used 
to categorise and discipline subordinate populations within prisons.  
Wacquant (2001) has developed this analysis further by incorporating a closer 
ethnic analysis of prison populations to suggest that prisons in the USA may 
be playing a role in sustaining white hegemony in that country (the paper was 
written before Obama became President but, in terms of the overall 
distribution of wealth in the USA, black and Hispanic groups are 
overrepresented in the groups living in poverty in 2012) (1). 
 
The challenge of post-modernism to foundational methodologies and, 
consequently, hegemonic knowledge has been profound.  Hammersley and 
Gomm (2000) suggest that the dominance of foundationalism in social 
science collapsed during the middle decades of the previous century and that 
this has led to the emergence of sceptical and relativist views (including post-
modernism).  Relativist views assert the locational specificity of the 
knowledges produced by research (Hammersley & Gomm 2000, p. 156; 
Harding 2006, pp 145-156).  While the logical validity of these knowledge 
claims has been questioned (Hammersley & Gomm 2000, p. 157), the effect 
of considering relativistic knowledges has been to assert the voices of 
subordinated populations.  
 
Alongside the relativistic response to foundational knowledge, standpoint 
theory has also provided a robust alternative voice – particularly, but not 
exclusively from feminist scholars (see for example Harding 1991, Lennon & 
Whitford, 1994; 2006; Code 2006).  Standpoint theories have provided the 
vehicle through which subordinated groupings - for example women (feminist 
standpoint), ethnic minorities (post-colonial theory) and gay and lesbian 
people (queer theory) - can develop research from a standpoint that does not 
objectify and interpret their experiences from a hegemonic (i.e. white, male, 
middle-class, middle-aged, able-bodied and heterosexual) perspective that is 
implicitly embodied in natural science methodologies.   Hammersley & Gomm 
(2000, p. 158) summarise standpoint theories thus: 
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… all accounts of the world reflect the social, ethnic, gendered etc 
position of the people who produced them. They are constructed on the 
basis of particular assumptions and purposes, and their truth or falsity 
can only be judged in terms of standards that are themselves social 
constructions, and therefore relative. 
 
 However, the theories and practices are not merely aspects of a cultural 
perspective, they are created or resist creation within a context of power and 
resistance.  In 1991, Sandra Harding commented that foundational 
approaches to research: 
 
fail to grasp that modern science has been constructed by and within 
power relations in society, not apart from them. The issue is not how one 
scientist or another used or abused social power in doing his (sic) 
science but rather where the sciences and their agendas, concepts, and 
consequences have been located within particular currents of politics. 
How have their ideas and practices advanced some groups at the 
expense of others? (Harding, 1991, p. 81) 
 
Social/criminological research occurs, not in a vacuum, but in dynamic 
relationship to political power.  Harding (2006) develops this argument more 
forcefully in her later work highlighting, in particular, the relationship between 
power and, not only research methodology, but also the research agenda as 
embodied in the sources of major funding for research.  This is an issue that 
is returned to later in this chapter.  However, in problematising epistemologies 
and highlighting the links between power and knowledge, post-modern 
thinking highlights the socially constructed nature of knowledge; a key 
concept in this process is the notion of discourse. 
Burr (2003, p. 64) has commented that the word discourse ‘refers to a set of 
meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on 
that in some way together produce a particular version of events.’  Foucault’s 
(1972, p. 117) fuller definition of the term is: ‘A body of anonymous, historical 
rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given 
period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the 
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conditions of operation of the enunciative function.’  Or more simply, ‘practices 
which form the objects of which they speak.’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 49 cited by 
Burr, 2003, p. 64).  However, Bell (1993, p. 42) further clarifies Foucault’s use 
of the term and locates discourse within a political context; knowledge and 
power are inextricably interwoven: 
 
For Foucault, [discourse] is both less and more than ‘‘language’’. It is 
less in that [it] is not a description of the whole language system . . . it is 
more in that it is not just speaking and writing, but entails social and 
political relations: one cannot dissociate discourse from a social context 
where relations of power and knowledge circulate. 
Lukes (2005: 88) highlights Foucault’s concern with power and knowledge, 
particularly ‘expert’ knowledges focused on ‘solving’ social problems (for 
example crime): 
 
[Foucault] proposed that there is a deep and intimate connection 
between power and knowledge, viewing these mechanisms in relation to 
the various applied social scientific disciplines that, so he argued, render 
them effective: their effectiveness, in his view, largely derives from the 
shaping impact on people of experts’ knowledge claims.  (Lukes, 2005: 
88). 
 
Walker and Boyeskie (2001) have developed this further in relation to 
criminological thought by highlighting how various criminological discourses 
have socially constructed ‘criminality’.  However, they caution against 
uncritically accepting dominant discourses of crime and criminality that are 
particularly driven by quantitative approaches:  ‘… unless discourse is 
understood, the relevance of theory driven research may be lost to obsession 
with proper methods and/or mesmerising statistical numeration’ (Walker and 
Boyeskie 2001, p. 109).  They suggest that postmodern approaches to 
discourse and discourse analysis point to the importance of an approach that 
is critically aware of the power of interpretation (hermeneutics) in 
understanding the ‘power of words in research, policy and the language of our 
field’ (Walker and Boyeskie 2001, p. 110).  They highlight the power implicit 
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in, for example, Beccaria’s  – language of ‘law’ or Foucault’s (1977) analysis 
of insanity and ‘unreason’ and power.   
 
Nevertheless, ‘expert knowledge’ is a key component of a discourse that has 
underpinned much criminological thought since the 19th century; this is the 
modernist notion of ‘progress’ which has its roots in the very origin of positivist 
thought.  Auguste Comte (1798-1857) is viewed as one of the founding 
thinkers of ‘sociology’.  He linked the development of ‘scientific’ ways of 
thinking with social progress and suggested that societies are destined to go 
through three stages of development the theological/religious, the 
metaphysical and the positive stages.  The final stage of development was 
characterised by the predominance of rational thought and scientific method.  
It was considered that eventually scientific method would develop and be 
applicable to all areas of study (the study of the science of humanity being the 
final stage of development).  The key feature of scientific method being that, 
by virtue of its rigour and ‘objectivity’ human problems could be studied and 
resolved; and of course it is from Comte’s terminology that the word ‘positivist’ 
was derived (Jenkins 2002, pp 20-22).  Thus the notion of ‘progress’ is 
inextricably interwoven with foundationalist/positivist epistemologies.   And 
progress was achieved by identifying universal laws that were deemed to 
apply to ‘humanity’.  In relation to criminology, Reiner (2007) points to the 
work of Lombroso, Ferri and the ‘moral statisticians’ Guerry and Quetelet as 
being significant early positivist thinkers.  As mentioned earlier, the positivist 
methodological orientation was predominantly (but not exclusively) 
quantitative and it sought to uncover generalisable laws and predict 
behaviours and social developments.  
 
Generalisable laws and particularly the prediction of behaviours are both 
central tenets and ongoing aspirations in the assessment of the likelihood that 
a person convicted of a criminal offence will re-offend.  This activity has 
become a central feature of the activities of many parts of the CJS.  In the 
next section of this chapter postmodern insights are brought to bear on risk 
assessment and the likelihood of reoffending. 
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‘The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’: a postmodern 
reflection on risk assessment (2) 
Risk assessment is an activity that is central to the operation of criminal 
justice agencies and also lies at the heart of a foundationalist approach.  The 
probation service has a standardised approach to assessing the risk of 
reoffending posed by each offender supervised using the Offender Group 
Reconviction Score (OGRS) and the structured tool, OASys (Canton, 2011).  
Since 2001 (with the formation of the National Probation Service) Probation 
Areas – now Probation Trusts - have employed forensic psychologists to 
assist in risk assessing serious offenders.  Moreover, forensic psychologists 
have worked in prisons and developed risk assessment protocols for a range 
of offenders for many years (McGurk et al, 1987).  Forensic psychology is the 
dominant discipline within the CJS concerned with the assessment of risk.  
There is an immense and enduring psychological literature in relation to risk 
assessment and risk management (for example see Beech and Ward, 2004;  
Bengtson and Långström, 2007). Essentially the literature is underpinned by 
foundationalist assumptions, and is concerned with developing more accurate 
means of predicting the likelihood that a convicted offender will commit 
another offence.  
 
The literature identifies two different approaches to assessment - actuarial 
and clinical (Grubin, 1999) or artefact and clinical (Kemshall, 2003). Actuarial 
approaches use risk factors that have been consistently identified as relevant 
criminogenic features  – typically these factors are: previous offences, 
relationship history, and criminality (Beech and Ward, 2004; Farrington, 2007) 
and are described as being static (i.e. they are not amenable to change). 
Clinical approaches are based on the assessment made by the professional 
(psychologist, psychiatrist, probation officer) dealing with the individual person 
who may pose a risk to others. Purely clinical approaches generally include 
consideration of dynamic factors (for example, mood, attitudes, physical 
circumstances – including the availability of victims) affecting the individual 
under assessment. However, the actuarial tendency in assessing offenders is 
strong within a broad 'community protection' approach (Kemshall. 2008) and 
the research literature continues to indicate that a pure actuarial approach is 
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more accurate in predicting re-offending (Bengtson and Långström, 2007).  A 
key feature of much of the psychological literature on risk and risk 
assessment is its ‘scientific’ and, therefore, inaccessible (to the lay reader) 
language. The terminologies, derived from medical, psychological and 
statistical vocabularies, together create what may be considered to be ‘expert’ 
knowledge. A key part of sustaining and developing this form of knowledge is 
the ‘risk analysis professional’ (Douglas, 1992, p. 11) who operates within ‘the 
favoured paradigm of individual rational choice’. Additionally, Douglas (1992, 
p. 12) notes that the development of risk ‘expertise’ has led to the 
development of specialist sub-disciplines that develop their own technical 
language (i.e. inaccessible to the general public) which, in its quest for 
‘objectivity’, ignores issues such as ‘intersubjectivity, consensus making . . . 
[and] social influences on decisions’.  Even the names of some of the 
instruments (Static – 99; Static – 2002; the Risk Matrix – 2002 – cited in 
Bengtson and Långström, 2007, p. 138) imply an abstracted technical world 
with processes and procedures only to be understood by technical ‘experts’. 
These are characteristics of ‘risk’ that have been identified in sociological, 
particularly post-modern, theory.  Bauman (1993, pp 200–8), for example,  
highlights how risk discourses, through technologized approaches to 
knowledge create a self-perpetuating highly technical form of knowledge as 
the only valid way to approach, understand, assess and manage risk. This 
has the effect of prioritizing certain forms of intellectual activity (calculative 
and mathematical) and certain subjects for inquiry (Bauman, 1993, p. 194).  
The offender and his ‘offending behaviour’ become the sole concern; other 
issues related to relationships, social class and other identities become 
erased and irrelevant to this administrative criminological gaze (Kemshall, 
2003, p. 69).  What this gaze does not see is the various discriminations that 
occur in criminal justice processes (for example, in relation to ethnicity, 
gender and class). 
 
However, as Robinson (2011, p. 107) has observed, although risk prediction 
is promoted as being an ‘objective’ and merely a ‘technical’ process, it is not 
value-free.  Moreover, it is also only as ‘strong’ as the information that is put 
into the system.  Thus, while the foundationalist aspiration of being able to 
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predict re-offending and particularly serious reoffending is sustained through 
increasingly complex iterations of assessment manuals, it is also brought 
under critical scrutiny through an examination of both values and practice.  
Robinson (2011, p. 107) comments that ‘the choice of tools and the use that is 
made of them in order to target services and surveillance can be extremely 
value-laden and potentially politicised.’  Douglas (1992) notes that the way 
that a culture constructs and manages risks provides insights into how that 
culture is structured and what issues shape its social organization (Sparks, 
2001, p. 168). Risk is a political vehicle used widely to legitimate the policies 
and practices of particular groups at specific times (Douglas, 1992, Sparks, 
2001).  
However, the process of risk assessment is not mechanistically undertaken by 
automatons.  While actuarial approaches to risk have the potential to oppress 
socially marginalised groups (Silver and Miller 2002), Canton and Eadie 
(2002, cited in Robinson 2011, p. 108) have highlighted the importance and 
role of professional values and accountabilities in recognising and, in some 
cases ameliorating these issues.  Effectively, concerns with social justice and 
values represent a different form of knowledge that may be in conflict with 
narrow administrative practices.   
 
Contested knowledges, power, resistance and research: the ‘dilemmas 
and predicaments’ of the 21st century criminologist 
Ian Loader and Richard Sparks (2011, p.26) have pointed to the ‘dilemmas 
and predicaments’ involved in answering  ‘questions concerning the work 
criminologists can and should do, the problems that are selected for attention, 
the methods deployed to solve them, and the audiences towards which such 
activity is addressed’.  This chapter concludes with reflection on these issues 
from a postmodern perspective and, to do this, it is essential to return to the 
challenges to foundationalist epistemologies identified earlier.  Hammersley 
and Gomm (2000, p. 160) indicate that, although in many ways foundationalist 
epistemology and associated methodologies were deemed to have failed by 
the end of the twentieth century, the principal radical alternative approaches 
(relativism and feminist standpoint theory) were also ‘weak’ and untenable. 
They therefore suggested that it was necessary to reconsider, amongst other 
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things, ‘the nature of  … bias as [it] relates to social research’ (Hammersley 
and Gomm 2000, p. 160).  This, inevitably, brings discussion full circle back to 
Becker’s statement in relation to bias power and knowledge: we provoke the 
charge of bias, in ourselves and others by refusing to give credence and 
deference to an established status order, in which knowledge of truth and the 
right to be heard are not equally distributed’ (Becker, 1967:242). 
 
The issue of bias is complex and is defined differently according to the 
epistemological standpoint of the researcher (Hammersley and Gomm 2000; 
Harding 2006). It is not the intention here to delve deeply into the 
philosophical and methodological implications of these debates.  There is, 
however one implication of post-modern deconstruction of foundationalist 
metanarratives that is of importance to this chapter; this is the identification of 
how the relationship between research funders and dominant forms of 
knowledge shapes the research agenda and inevitably prioritises some forms 
of knowledge and excludes others.  Hammersley and Gomm (2000, p. 165) 
have suggested that ‘we live in dangerous times for research’.  The agendas 
of those funding research are driving what is to be researched and how it is to 
be researched.  They suggest that ‘the pursuit of knowledge’ is subordinated 
to more applied outcomes defined before any research has occurred.  They 
worry that the increased emphasis on the role of research ‘users’, is shaping a 
narrowly utilitarian concept of knowledge.  More recent developments in the 
assessment of research outcomes (3) that give weight to the ‘impact’ of 
research have added to these concerns.   Similarly Walters (2009) has 
examined the nature of research funded and undertaken by the Home Office 
Research Development and Statistics Directorate (HORDS) and also the 
Scottish Executive.  He has identified ‘how Home Office criminology is 
politically driven; how it provides policy salient information for politically 
relevant crime and criminal justice issues; how its research agenda is 
motivated by outcomes that are of immediate benefit to existing political 
demands’ (Walters, 2009, p. 207).  However, for Walters (2008), it is through 
the research funding activities of central governments that some activities are 
defined as crime whilst others are ignored.  He highlights how the activities of 
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working class people are more likely to be viewed as crimes whereas 
dishonest activities of middle class affluent groups may be neglected: 
 
It is clear that the Home Office is only interested in rubber-stamping the 
political priorities of the government of the day.  If it were concerned with 
understanding and explaining the most violent aspect of contemporary 
British Society (notably the modern corporation), it would fund projects 
that analyse corporate negligence, commercial disasters and workplace 
injuries – but it doesn’t. (Walters, 2008, p. 13) 
 
 He further outlines other aspects of how funded research knowledge creates 
a particular version of events – generally designed to serve the interests of 
the funder.   
 
However, Walters (2009, p. 210) suggests that criminology does not have to 
play the tune demanded by the paymaster. He identifies the development of a 
‘public criminology that … takes as part of its defining mission a more 
vigorous systematic and effective intervention in the world of social policy and 
social action’ |(Walters, 2009, p. 210).  Constitutive penology ‘as an analytical 
approach to examining the discourses, institutions, philosophies, and 
practices of punishing’  (Barker 2010, p. 237) adopts a similar critical position; 
Cowling (2006, p. 8) notes that the aim of constitutive criminologists is not to 
‘replace one truth with another’ instead it is to invoke ‘a multiplicity of 
resistances’ ‘to the ubiquity of power’.  The work of Chong Ho Shon (2002) 
illustrates these processes by exploring the detail of encounters between the 
police and citizens; for example, he notes that  ‘prior research has overlooked 
instances of language use where the meaning and intention is ambiguous or 
where a participant subverts the communicative process by saying one thing 
to mean another’. (Chong Ho Shon, 2002, p. 151).  Edwards and Sheptycki 
(2009) similarly identify a new form of criminology (‘third wave’), which 
acknowledges the politics of research without a partisan approach.  
 
A key part of developing these approaches is to recognise and utilise a wide 
range of knowledges developed in a variety of subordinated groups.  This 
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requires criminology and criminologists to participate in dissemination beyond 
the university classroom and academic journals.  It requires the recognition of 
diversity and diverse forms of knowledge.  It requires recognition and rejection 
of grand homogenising ‘meta-narratives’ and the validation of diverse voices.  
However, for this activity to be effective, it requires a type of academic rigour 
that is critical and aware of epistemological issues in the construction of 
knowledge.  Although Hammersley and Gomm (2000, p. 165) suggest that 
aligned and campaigning standpoints are not appropriate for research 
because ‘… they do not maximise the chances of discovering the truth about 
the matter concerned, which is the primary responsibility of the researcher’, 
they appear to have re-adopted foundationalist assumptions about the nature 
of truth.  The work of Sandra Harding (1991, 2006) may provide a post-
modern way through the seeming impasse.  She argues for what she calls 
‘strong objectivity’ or a pluralist approach to knowledge building.  ‘Strong 
objectivity’ requires the researcher to state the ideological and political 
position from which they make their inquiries and explore the relationship of 
these to the matter being researched, the method whereby it has been 
researched, the resultant findings and what others have published (Harding, 
1991, p. 152).  ‘Strong objectivity’ requires that the knower, the researcher 
explicitly theorise his/her effect – as an involved party - in the creation of 
knowledge.    
 
Postmodernism provides many challenges for criminology, an academic 
discipline initially built upon foundationalist epistemological assumptions.  
Through engaging with the challenges some criminologies have changed.  
Public criminology recognises the need to incorporate a range of experiences 
and knowledge.  It critically examines the role of research and how this relates 
to broader criminological/sociological issues such as the defining and policing 
of certain acts as criminal.  Reflexive criminological practice does require 
criminologists to ponder on issues of allegiances in all stages of research.  
However, allegiance or strong objectivity does not automatically equate with a 
simple taking of sides.  As Liebling has noted: 
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In my experience it is possible to take more than one side seriously, to find 
merit in more than one perspective, and to do this without causing outrage 
on the side of officials or prisoners, but this is a precarious position with a 
high emotional price to pay. (Liebling, 2001, p. 473) 
 
However to do this requires the researcher to be able to account fully for how 
findings have been achieved.  Harding (2006, p. 156) summarises the 
challenges and the hopes that post-modernism presents: 
 
… we can be confident that the sciences thought to have advanced the 
forms of democratic social relations envisioned by the Enlightenment 
and its heirs today are most likely not the ones that work well to advance 
the new forms of democratic social relations for which feminisms, 
multiculturalism and postcolonialisms yearn today.  Nor can they engage 
effectively with the recently appearing new ways of producing scientific 
knowledge.  … The rise of new social values, interests and the relations 
they direct requires new inquiry practices and principles that can support 
and in turn be supported by these new forms of, we hope, democratic 
social relations.  Our methodological and epistemological choices are 
always also ethical and political choices. 
 
Notes 
(1) See United States Census Bureau (2012) The National Data Book; 
The2012 Statistical Abstract, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0711.pdf 
(2)  This section draws from and develops the work of Cowburn (2010, 
pp234-7)  
(3) See http://www.ref.ac.uk/panels/assessmentcriteriaandleveldefinitions/ 
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